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55 
ONE RING TO RULE THEM ALL: INDIVIDUAL 
JUDGMENTS, NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS, AND 
UNIVERSAL HANDCUFFS 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo* 
One of the earliest decisions by the Supreme Court of the United 
States—Marbury v. Madison—sets forth one of the most ancient principles of 
Anglo-American law—viz., there is a judicial remedy for every legal wrong.1  
Over the last three administrations, numerous inferior federal courts have 
taken that principle a giant step further.  Those courts have decided that, 
when the government acts unlawfully, they may not only remedy the plaintiff’s 
injury but also protect everyone else by enjoining the Executive Branch from 
repeating the same conduct.2  Sometimes labeled “nationwide,” “universal,” 
 
  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 65 (1954) (“He [Sauron the Great, the 
Dark Lord] only needs the One; for he made that Ring himself, it is his, and he let a great 
part of his own former power pass into it, so that he could rule all the others.”). 
 *  Paul J. Larkin, Jr. is the John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research 
Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P., George Washington University, 2010; J.D., 
Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1977.  GianCarlo Canaparo 
is a Legal Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 
2014; B.A., University of California at Davis, 2011.  The views expressed in this Article are 
our own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage 
Foundation.  We want to thank John G. Malcolm for excellent comments on an earlier 
iteration of this Article.  Any mistakes are ours. 
 1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever 
that right is invaded.”(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23)).  The irony 
of Marbury is that the Court denied William Marbury the relief he was entitled to receive 
because the statute authorizing the Court to hear his case was unconstitutional.  Id. at 162, 
180. 
 2 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 
2017), vacated and remanded as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 
1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017); Guilford Coll. v. Wolf, No. 1:18CV891, 2020 WL 586672, at *12 
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2020); HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 415 F. Supp. 3d 669, 686–87 (D. Md. 2020); 
El Paso County v. Trump, 407 F. Supp. 3d 655, 668 (W.D. Tex. 2019), injunction stayed, No. 
19-51144 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2020); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. 
Ill. 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in 
part, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), vacated, Nos. 17-2991 & 18-
2649, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018) (vacating only the court’s previous decision 
to rehear the case en banc); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504, at *1 
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“third-party,” or even “cosmic” injunctions,3 those orders are better seen as 
handcuffs, since their purpose and effect is to bind the hands of executive 
officials to arrest them from doing mischief elsewhere. 
Although lacking any historical pedigree in Anglo-American law,4 during 
the last three presidential administrations, this practice has spread like kudzu, 
vexing the efforts of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald 
Trump to institute policies that each one thought lawful, beneficial, and 
necessary.5  The Supreme Court has noted the issue, but not resolved it,6 
 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), 
aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); 
see also, e.g., Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2097–98, 2097 
nn.5–8, 2098 nn.10–11 (2017) (collecting cases). 
 3 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring in the grant of stay) (speaking of “cosmic” injunctions); Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining his preference for 
the term “universal” injunction).  The nomenclature is misleading.  A prevailing party can 
rely on a final judgment anywhere.  See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 
(1952); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452 (1932).  A third party 
cannot.  See infra Part III. 
 4 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple 
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 425 (2017) [hereinafter 
Bray, Multiple Chancellors].  One commentator has argued that the universal injunction 
practice has roots in twentieth-century case law.  See Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the 
“Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924, 959–79 (2020).  The isolated cases that 
she cites, even if read to support her claim—but see Samuel Bray, Response to The Lost History 
of the “Universal” Injunction, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-response-to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunction-by-
samuel-bray/ (arguing that Professor Sohoni misinterprets or fails to contextualize many of 
the cases she cites and dramatically misreads Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), 
a case central to her thesis)—pale by comparison to what Anglo-American courts have not 
done for nearly a millennium.  See, e.g., Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Sometimes, the dog that does not bark sends a clear message.  Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 347 (1930). 
 5 See Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 457–59 (detailing a series of 
nationwide injunctions thwarting different policy proposals by the last three 
administrations).  U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen recently noted that 
nationwide injunctions have become “almost a routine step in a regulation or policy’s 
lifecycle.”  Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Opening Remarks at 
Forum on Nationwide Injunctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020).  He 
probably feels under almost constant attack given that this Administration has been hit with 
nationwide injunctions in numerous areas, such as President Trump’s executive order 
restricting entry by immigrants from certain countries, his use of military construction funds 
to build a border wall, his policy of letting states opt out of refugee resettlement programs, 
and his change to the way the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services calculates the 
duration of illegal aliens’ unlawful presence in the country—to name just a few.  See Bray, 
Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 459. 
 6 See Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (mem.) (order granting 
certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454 (U.S. 
petition for cert filed Oct. 3, 2019) (Question Presented No. 3: “Whether the court of appeals 
erred in affirming a nationwide preliminary injunction barring implementation of the final 
rules.”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 601 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of 
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although Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch have decried the 
practice in their separate opinions.7  The issue has shown no signs of going 
away, so the Court is likely to address it fairly soon.8 
A large and growing body of literature criticizes nationwide injunctions,9 
although a handful of scholars have come to their qualified defense.10  The 
literature has focused on whether universal injunctions comport with the 
historic scope of federal courts’ equitable powers and are good policy to boot.  
Largely missing from the debate is a fulsome analysis of whether the 
Constitution or the Judicial Code authorizes federal courts to issue such 
injunctions and whether they are permissible under existing Supreme Court 
precedent.  We argue that the answer to each question is “no.” 
Parts I and II explain that no positive law authorizes universal injunctions 
and that the architecture of the federal judicial system strongly implies that 
they are overbroad.  Part I discusses the Constitution; Part II, the Judicial 
Code.  Part III explains why the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. 
Mendoza11 and Williams v. Zbaraz12 disallow that practice.  That Part also 
addresses the policy arguments for nationwide injunctions and shows that, as 
long as Mendoza and Zbaraz are good law, courts cannot bind the federal 
government always and everywhere by an adverse judgment in one lawsuit.  
Our conclusion is this: the lower federal courts are obliged to provide 
complete relief to the party who prevailed in court—but no further.  Congress is 
the forum for deciding what relief should be afforded to the public at large. 
 
stay); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 
555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (noting the issue but leaving it undecided). 
 7 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 599–601 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant 
of stay); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 8 The Court just this July remanded a case with instructions to dissolve a nationwide 
injunction.  Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 
2373 (2020) (reversing the Third Circuit’s judgment and remanding with instructions to 
dissolve the nationwide preliminary injunction).  In October 2020, the Court granted 
certiorari in a case presenting the question whether a universal preliminary injunction was 
overbroad.  See Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19-1212, 2020 WL 6121563 (U.S. Oct. 19, 
2020) (mem.) (order granting cert.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Wolf v. Innovation 
Law Lab, No. 19-1212, 2020 WL 6121563 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (mem.) (No. 19-1212) 
(Question Presented No. 4: “Whether the district court’s universal preliminary injunction 
is impermissibly overbroad.”). 
 9 See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 275–76 (4th ed. 2010); 
Siddique, supra note 2, at 2099 n.18 (collecting authorities); Sohoni, supra note 4, at 923 
n.16 (same). 
 10 See, e.g., Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Response, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 49 (2017), 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/12/nationwide-injunctions-nationwide-harm/; 
Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2019); 
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018). 
 11 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
 12 448 U.S. 358 (1980). 
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I.     THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
As one branch of a limited government of enumerated powers, the 
federal judiciary, like Congress and the President, has only the authority that 
the Constitution or another law expressly or impliedly grants it.  What, then, 
does the Constitution say about remedies?  The answer is, not much.13 
The text expressly addresses remedies only in two places: the 
Suspension14 and Just Compensation Clauses.15  The former relates to habeas 
corpus, an ancient writ requiring a jailer “to produce the body” so that a court 
can decide whether the prisoner has been convicted of a crime or just irritated 
the local sheriff.16  The Suspension Clause assumes that habeas corpus is 
available for federal courts to examine the legality of a party’s confinement 
and prohibits Congress from suspending the writ except when necessary for 
public safety in the case of insurrection or war.17  As for the Just Compensation 
Clause: that is a monetary remedy, payable in the same coin as an award of 
damages for a contract breach or tort.  The Clause guarantees a property 
owner “just compensation”—viz., the fair market value of the property taken, 
“what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller” at the time of the 
taking18—when the government takes his or her private property.19  What 
those clauses have in common is that they limit an Article III court’s 
adjudicative power to the particular dispute between specific parties.  In the 
case of habeas corpus, only “the body” is released, not the entire prison 
population.20  In the case of a taking, just compensation is paid only to each 
particular prevailing property owner for the specific amount of his own 
peculiar loss.21  Courts do not revise the Criminal Code, nor do they make 
land use planning decisions. 
Other constitutional provisions deal with judicial remedies by 
implication.  Several provisions grant exclusive adjudicative, managerial, or 
 
 13 Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1969) (“The 
Constitution is almost completely silent concerning the remedies to be employed for its 
implementation.”). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE. L.J. 1425, 1509 n.329 
(1987) (“[T]he non-suspension clause is the original Constitution’s most explicit reference 
to remedies.”). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 16 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *131 (“But the great and efficacious writ in all 
manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the 
person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner.”). 
 17 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–52 (2008). 
 18 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
 19 See First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 315 (1987). 
 20 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 136 (1807). 
 21 See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979). 
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remedial authority to Congress or the President, which impliedly forecloses 
supplementary judicial solutions.  Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers” in 
Congress, it defines how a “Bill” may become a “Law,” and it specifies that 
“[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue” must originate in the House of 
Representatives.22  Article I also vests in each chamber of Congress the 
authority to judge the qualifications of Representatives and Senators, 
respectively; to punish or expel a member for misconduct; and to decide 
whether to impeach and remove a member of the Executive Branch.23  Article 
II makes the President “Commander in Chief” of the military and empowers 
him to “grant Reprieves and Pardons” for federal offenses, “make Treaties,” 
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and appoint Supreme 
Court Justices as well as “other Officers of the United States.”24  As a result, 
no court may order Congress to pass a law, expel a member, impeach and 
remove an executive officer, raise taxes, or declare war.  Nor may a court 
direct the President how to grant mercy, manage the prosecution of a war, 
make foreign-policy decisions for the nation, or staff the government. 
The Article III Vesting Clause grants federal courts the “judicial Power” 
to adjudicate specified “Cases” and “Controversies.”25  Those terms draw their 
meaning not only from the assignment of responsibilities in Articles I and II, 
but also from the practices of the English common-law and equity courts.26  
That is, the new federal courts were responsible for answering questions of 
“Law and Equity” that arose while they presided over “Trial[s]” in “criminal 
prosecutions” or “Suits at common law.”27  As James Madison put it, the 
 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (the Vesting Clause); id. § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising 
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”); id. § 7, cls. 2, 3 (establishing the 
bicameralism and presentment requirements). 
 23 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (granting the House of Representatives “the sole Power of 
Impeachment”); id. § 3, cl. 6 (granting the Senate “the sole Power” to try an impeachment); 
id. § 5, cl. 1 (making each chamber “the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications 
of its own Members”); id. cl. 2 (granting each house power to “punish” or “expel” its 
members). 
 24 Id. art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2; id. § 3. 
 25 Id. art. III, § 1; id. § 2 cl. 1. 
 26 In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter: 
Both by what they said and by what they implied, the framers of the Judiciary 
Article gave merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar operations of 
the English judicial system and its manifestations on this side of the ocean before 
the Union.  Judicial power could come into play only in matters that were the 
traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that 
to the expert feel of lawyers constituted “Cases” or “Controversies.” . . .  [E]ven 
as to the kinds of questions which were the staple of judicial business, it was not 
for courts to pass upon them as abstract, intellectual problems but only if a 
concrete, living contest between adversaries called for the arbitrament of law. 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 27 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. cl. 3; id. amend. VI; id. amend. VII. 
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federal courts were to resolve matters “of a Judiciary Nature.”28  A federal 
court has the responsibility to enter a final judgment disposing of every 
criminal and civil case properly filed within its jurisdiction,29 but that 
judgment reaches only the parties to that case.  As in the case of general civil 
suits and criminal prosecutions, the court can adjudicate only the dispute 
between the parties, rather than legislate in a wholesale manner by entering 
a judgment for everyone potentially affected.  The remedy is no broader than 
the judgement, which itself is confined to the parties.30  As William Blackstone 
put it, “[f]inal judgements are such as at once put an end to the action, by 
declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover 
the remedy he sues for.”31 
 
 28 James Madison, Monday Augst. 27th, 1787 In Convention, in 2 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 426, 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (referencing the 
United States Supreme Court).   
 29 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995) (ruling that 
Congress cannot reopen a final judgment entered by an Article III court); Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (noting that federal courts 
generally have “the duty . . . to adjudicate a controversy properly before” them (quoting 
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959))). 
 30 That is particularly true in the case of a preliminary injunction.  Its purpose is to 
maintain the status quo until the case can be resolved on the merits.  See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. 
v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely 
to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”).  A 
plaintiff need not prove that he will prevail at trial, only that he might be successful and 
that the “balance of equities” favors leaving the parties where they are.  See Winter v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction 
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.”).  Nationwide injunctions are altogether 
inappropriate at the preliminary stage because, at that early stage, a plaintiff “is not 
required to prove his case in full,” and “a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on 
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial 
on the merits.”  Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395; see also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 (1975) 
(“[A] state statute should not be declared unconstitutional by a district court if a 
preliminary injunction is granted a plaintiff to protect his interests during the ensuing 
litigation.”). 
 31 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *398.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
implement Blackstone’s simple conception of a judgment as a declaration of victory or loss 
for a specific plaintiff or plaintiffs.  Rule 17 requires that “[a]n action must be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest” so that the trial court knows which parties will be 
affected by a judgment.  FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).  Rule 23 allows one party to act as a class 
representative, but “only if” specified “[p]rerequisites” are satisfied.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) defining those “[p]rerequisites”).  Rule 54 defines a judgment 
as “a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a).  It also forbids 
the judgment from containing any extraneous information, such as recitals of pleadings, a 
master’s report, or court records.  Id.  In addition, it directs the court to clearly specify which 
claims and parties the judgment applies to.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).  Rule 58, meanwhile, 
requires that every judgment “be set out in a separate document.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a).  
The purpose of those rules is to give the parties clarity as to when a judgment has been 
entered and in whose favor so that they have a clear sense of what must happen to enforce, 
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What that means is this: in a criminal prosecution, a federal court can 
enter a judgment before trial that dismisses charges improperly brought.32  
After trial, the court can order the accused to be punished or freed, 
depending on the jury’s verdict, and impose a punishment identified by 
Congress in the act creating a criminal offense.33  In a civil action, a court can 
award the same type of monetary or injunctive relief available in England at 
law or equity when this nation came into being.34  That is all.  The Article III 
adjudicative power vested in federal courts is not a charter to substitute 
appointed judges for elected officials.35  Nationwide injunctions differ 
 
preserve, or challenge the trial court’s decision.  10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2651–52 (4th ed. 2014) 
(pertaining to Rule 54); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2781 (3d ed. 2012) (pertaining to Rule 58). 
 32 No one may be charged with a “capital” or “otherwise infamous crime” unless a 
grand jury has indicted him for it.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  No one may twice be “put in 
jeopardy of life or limb” for “the same offen[s]e.”  Id.  Everyone accused of a crime shall 
be tried in the state and district where it was allegedly committed.  Id. amend. VI.  A trial 
court may dismiss any charges not in compliance with those requirements. 
 33 See, e.g., Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 330 (2013) (ruling that even an erroneous 
acquittal bars a retrial for the same offense); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) 
(ruling that federal courts must impose a sentence consistent with the relevant act of 
Congress); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (ruling that Congress 
must define all federal crimes). 
 34 See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 
308, 318 (1999) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction 
over ‘all suits . . . in equity.’ . . .  We have long held that ‘[t]he “jurisdiction” thus 
conferred . . . is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of 
judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court 
of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.’” (first quoting Judiciary Act 
of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 stat. 73, 78; and then quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 
U.S. 563, 568 (1939))); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 708–09 (1999) (ruling that the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial right applies to 
common law causes of action and analogous statutory ones). 
 35 See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (“Our power as judges to ‘say 
what the law is,’ . . . rests not on the default of politically accountable officers, but is instead 
grounded in and limited by the necessity of resolving, according to legal principles, a 
plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right.” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803))); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132–33 (2011) 
(“Under Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not questions 
and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’  This language restricts the federal judicial power 
‘to the traditional role of the Anglo-American courts.’ . . .  In the English legal tradition, 
the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial 
resolution and gave legitimacy to judicial decrees. . . .  If the judicial power were ‘extended 
to every question under the constitution,’ Chief Justice Marshall once explained, federal 
courts might take possession of ‘almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and 
decision.’” (first quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009); and then 
quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984))); Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“In part those words [‘cases’ and ‘controversies’] limit the business 
of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically 
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.  And in part those words define 
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markedly from the remedies contemplated by Article III because the former 
exceed the party-specific reach of the judgment and partake more of 
legislation. 
The Framers did not stumble into the division of labor established by 
Articles I, II, and III, nor did it occur by happenstance.  By the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, England already had a long history of courts serving in 
multiple capacities.36  In the pre-Norman Era, the Anglo-Saxon kings relied 
on the witan, a council of elders, with whom they would consult to determine 
what tribal custom fixed as the law.37  After William I became king, the witan 
became known as the King’s Court or Curia Regis, which exercised legislative, 
executive, and judicial power.38  Late in the fifteenth century, a court of 
general jurisdiction, consisting of the king’s councilors and common-law 
judges, known as the Star Chamber, emerged as a component of the Privy 
Council.39  During the English Civil War, Parliament stripped the Privy 
Council of its domestic adjudicative authority, but it continued to dispense 
justice and approve local legislation tentatively adopted in the Crown’s 
colonies, including the ones in America.40  The House of Lords also exercised 
legislative and judicial power by serving as one half of a bicameral Parliament 
and the highest court in England.41  English law therefore saw nothing 
improper in the same body wearing more than one lawmaking, law-enforcing, 
and law-adjudicating hat.42 
The Framers also had a similar local example to consider.  The New York 
Constitution of 1777 created a Council of Revision that included judges as 
members and invested that council, rather than the governor, with veto and 
revisionary power over legislation.43  Guided by Montesquieu’s separation-of-
powers theory, the Framers considered and rejected that approach at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787,44 thereby making the point that the 
judiciary should have no part in the lawmaking process.  Because a universal 
injunction partakes more of the nature of a “Law” than a judgment resolving 
a “Case” or “Controversy,” the decision made at the Constitutional 
Convention to confine the judiciary to the latter is powerful evidence that 
courts should limit themselves to entering a judgment that does no more than 
resolve the case at hand and remedy the injury suffered by the parties. 
 
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal 
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”). 
 36 See, e.g., James T. Barry III, Comment, The Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial 
Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237–43 (1989). 
 37 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 293, 
327–32 (2016) (describing the evolution of early English law). 
 38 Barry, supra note 36, at 237. 
 39 See id. at 238. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 239. 
 42 See id. at 238–41. 
 43 See id. at 243–45. 
 44 See id. at 248–57. 
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II.     THE JUDICIAL CODE 
Nothing in the Judicial Code grants courts the legislative-like power 
some federal judges have assumed.  For example, no statute defining federal 
court jurisdiction permits a court to award a remedy to a nonparty.45  In fact, 
two statutes strongly imply that Congress has limited the courts’ remedial 
power to only the parties to a case.  One law divests a district court of 
jurisdiction when a party has been “improperly or collusively” joined,46 while 
the statute creating supplemental jurisdiction limits it to claims “so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.”47  The Declaratory Judgment Act makes that point too.48  It 
limits the scope of an equitable remedy to the parties to a lawsuit by providing 
that that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction” a federal 
court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration.”49  Nonparties are not within the case or controversy 
that allows a declaratory judgment to be awarded.50 
Those limitations are not modern-day anomalies.  Neither the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 nor any of its offspring granted federal courts the full extent of 
the judicial power available to them under Article III.51  That omission is 
 
 45 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1369. 
 46 Id. § 1359 (“A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any 
party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to 
invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”). 
 47 Id. § 1367.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 further bolsters this point.  It requires 
that a district court join a nonparty in the case when that person has an interest in the case 
that cannot be adequately protected or disposed of without the person’s participation, and 
requires the court to dismiss an action when “in equity and good conscience” the action 
cannot proceed among the existing parties.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 48 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. 
 49 Id. § 2201.  Moreover, declaratory judgments were unknown to the law until 1919, 
when some state legislatures began to pass such laws.  10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2752 (4th ed. 2016). 
 50 See supra note 35; cf. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. 
Ct. 1205 (2020).  In that case, a district court ruled that the deadline to receive election 
ballots had to be extended.  Id. at 1206–07.  In order to give force to that ruling, the district 
court enjoined state officials, who were not parties to the lawsuit, from releasing the election 
results for six days after the election.  Id. at 1207.  The Supreme Court reversed those orders 
to the extent they required state officials to count ballots after the official election deadline, 
and called the order enjoining nonparties “unusual.”  Id. at 1207–08.  
 51 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802); Judiciary Act of 
1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156; Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209; Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; Judiciary Act of 
1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (correcting 
Act of Mar. 3,1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552); Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; Judicial 
Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087; Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.  For a more 
detailed history of the evolution of the modern federal court system, see 13 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3504 (3d ed. 2008).  Some of the aforementioned statutes were more 
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significant.  The Supreme Court has noted that Congress is under no 
obligation to grant federal courts the full extent of the authority that Article 
III would permit.52  In fact, the Court has upheld Congress’s authority to limit 
the remedies available to Article III courts.53  It therefore cannot be argued 
that the ability to award nationwide injunctions is a historic incident of the 
power of the federal judiciary to resolve cases and controversies. 
The architecture of the federal judiciary also undermines any such 
argument.  Today’s federal system is arranged vertically and horizontally.  
Congress divided the states into one or more judicial districts54 and grouped 
those districts into twelve circuits.55  District courts are nisi prius courts—i.e., 
triers of fact.56  Circuit courts have appellate jurisdiction, but only over the 
districts within each respective circuit.57  That structure becomes important 
when one considers the stare decisis effect of a federal court’s decision.  A 
circuit court’s ruling is a binding precedent for all district courts in that 
circuit, but it does not establish the law in another circuit.58  Similarly, district 
court opinions have no stare decisis effect at all.  They do not bind any other 
court, or even the judge who issued the opinion.59  To put it another way, the 
 
commonly referred to as the “Midnight Judges Act” (Judiciary Act of 1801), the “Evarts 
Act” (Judiciary Act of 1891), and the “Judges’ Bill” (Judiciary Act of 1925).  Id. 
 52 See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); see also Senate Select Comm. 
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) (“Simply 
stated, Congress may impart as much or as little of the judicial power as it deems 
appropriate and the Judiciary may not thereafter on its own motion recur to the Article III 
storehouse for additional jurisdiction.  When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
truly, to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.”); 
WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & FREER, supra note 51, § 3526 (discussing Congress’s control 
over federal court jurisdiction). 
 53 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 112 (2004) (upholding a law that prohibits 
lower courts from restraining the collection of a state tax); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 
U.S. 323, 329–30, 333 (1938) (upholding a law that restricts courts’ ability to grant 
injunctive relief in labor disputes). 
 54 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81–131 (2018) (specifying the geographic scope of the districts 
within each state); id. § 132 (establishing a district court within each district). 
 55 See id. § 41 (specifying the composition of the various circuit courts).  There also 
are some additional, specialized courts of appeals.  See infra note 57. 
 56 See, e.g., id. §§ 1330–1332. 
 57 See id. § 1291; id. § 1294 (“[A]ppeals from reviewable decisions of the district and 
territorial courts shall be taken . . . [f]rom a district court of the United States to the court 
of appeals for the circuit embracing the district.”).  There are a few exceptions to this rule 
for appeals of cases invoking the specific subject-matter jurisdiction of the specialty courts 
like the Federal Circuit, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Federal Claims.  
See id. §§ 1292(c)–(d), 1295. 
 58 See Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and Judicial Estoppel, in 18 JAMES 
WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 134.02[2] (Daniel R. Coquillette, Gregory P. 
Joseph, Sol Schreiber, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 3d ed. 2015). 
 59 Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district 
court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial 
district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quoting Solum, supra note 58, 
¶ 134.02[1][d])). 
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district court for the Southern District of New York must obey Second Circuit 
precedents, but is free to ignore the diktats of the Ninth Circuit.60 
Finally, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines the 
requirements necessary for a district court to enter a judgment binding on 
absent parties.61  The purpose of the rule is to avoid repetitive litigation, but 
that purpose is constrained by the class certification requirement.62  In Baxter 
v. Palmigiano, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred by entering 
a judgment granting classwide relief without first certifying a class.63  
Nationwide injunctions cannot be squared with Rule 23 and Baxter.  If courts 
cannot grant classwide judgments to an uncertified class, it is nonsensical to 
allow them to grant the same relief to an uncertified class of everyone, 
everywhere. 
Some defenders of nationwide injunctions have relied on the 
Administrative Procedure Act64 as support.65  Their argument is that because 
the APA directs a court to “set aside” unlawful agency action,66 a court may 
enjoin the federal government from applying a statute or rule to any other 
party.  That argument is unpersuasive.  As Professor Samuel Bray has 
 
 60 See, e.g., TM Patents v. IBM, 107 F. Supp. 2d 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Only 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the relevant Courts of Appeals are 
binding on a District Court.”). 
 61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (permitting class-wide injunctive relief only if the class 
certification requirements are satisfied and the relief would be appropriate for every 
member of the class). 
 62 See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1751, 1759–69 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the 
purpose of class actions and the class certification requirements).  
 63 425 U.S. 308, 311 n.1 (1976). 
 64 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018). 
 65 See, e.g., Amdur & Hausman, supra note 10, at 54 (arguing that under the APA, 
courts regularly strike down policies wholesale). 
 66 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).  The D.C. Circuit has held that the APA permits—but does 
not require—courts to issue nationwide injunctions because “[w]hen a reviewing court 
determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are 
vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”  Nat’l 
Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  In reaching its holding, 
the court relied on Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 
U.S. 871 (1990), and a concern that “refusal to sustain a broad injunction is likely merely 
to generate a flood of duplicative litigation.”  Id.  As Zayn Siddique explains in his article, 
the D.C. Circuit’s argument “cannot be justified on precedential or prudential grounds.”  
Siddique, supra note 2, at 2121.  First, the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent is misplaced—aside from the fact that it is a dissent—because its permissive language 
does not support the court’s conclusion that the “ordinary result” of a ruling against the 
government in an APA case is that a regulation must be struck down.  Id.  Second, the D.C. 
Circuit ineffectually distinguished a nearly identical case from the Third Circuit that 
granted only individualized relief despite concluding that the regulation was unlawful.  Id.  
And third, the court’s prudential argument was “overstated” and “would not only foreclose 
possible duplicative litigation in its own circuit but also preclude reasoned consideration by 
any other court.”  Id. at 2122–23. 
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explained, “[n]ational injunctions were not contemplated when the APA was 
enacted [in 1946].”67  Moreover, when the APA was enacted, agencies acted 
primarily through adjudication, not rulemaking, and the choice of “set aside” 
is consistent with reversing adjudications because “in prior judicial usage the 
phrase was used for reversing judgments.”68  Finally, it was settled law when 
Congress passed the APA in 1946 that nonparties could not benefit from a 
judgment entered in someone else’s favor.69  Thus, even in the context of APA 
cases, no law gives the courts the power to issue nationwide injunctions. 
III.     THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS IN UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA AND 
WILLIAMS V. ZBARAZ 
An act of Congress governs everyone to whom its terms reach.70  By 
contrast, an injunction is a coercive remedy used to enforce a court’s 
judgment,71 and, as the Supreme Court has made clear, “should be no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to 
the plaintiffs.”72  The starting point for analyzing the propriety of any grant of 
injunctive relief is the underlying judgment, which identifies the parties and 
the outcome of the case.  That is why the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in 
United States v. Mendoza imposes a substantial roadblock to the nationwide 
injunction practice.73  It does not permit a court to use an adverse judgment 
against the federal government in any other case, and there is no material 
difference between what Mendoza forbids and what numerous courts have 
done through nationwide injunctions. 
Mendoza involved the preclusive effect of a judgment entered against the 
federal government in an earlier lawsuit involving the same legal issue but 
different parties.  The Supreme Court unanimously held that the federal 
government cannot be estopped from relitigating the validity of a position 
that it took in an earlier lawsuit that it lost.  Mendoza effectively rejected every 
defense of nationwide injunctions that their supporters make.  As long as 
Mendoza is good law, no court can enter a nationwide injunction against the 
federal government outside of a class action. 
 
 67 Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 438 n.121. 
 68 Id.; see also Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 124 (1894) (explaining that a challenge 
to a patent-office adjudication is “a proceeding to set aside the conclusions reached by the 
administrative department” and is analogous to “a suit to set aside a judgment”). 
 69 See, e.g., Litchfield v. Goodnow’s Administrator, 123 U.S. 549, 552 (1887) (No 
judgment binds “a stranger to the proceedings.”); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (AM. 
L. INST. 1942). 
 70 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“No man in this country is so high 
that he is above the law.”). 
 71 See, e.g., James Barr Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REV. 261, 261–
62 (1908); Siddique, supra note 2, at 2107. 
 72 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (quoting Califano 
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)); see also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
406, 420 (1977). 
 73 464 U.S. 154 (1984). 
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At issue in Mendoza were the rules of issue and claim preclusion, which 
were historically called issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata.  Those 
rules sought to simplify litigation by preventing the same parties from 
relitigating a final judgment entered in a lawsuit between them.  If A prevailed 
against B in litigation, the final judgment resolved their dispute.  That 
judgment, however, did not affect the rights of C unless C had a close enough 
relationship with A or B—called being in “privity” with A or B—to justify 
treating C as the alter ego of one of them.74  Over time, critics said that the 
common law of claim and issue preclusion should apply more broadly,75 and 
the Supreme Court ultimately agreed.  In 1971, the Court decided in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation that in suit by A against C, 
C could make defensive use of a judgment against A in A’s prior suit against 
B,76 and eighteen years later, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the Court allowed 
C to make “offensive” use of a judgment against B that was obtained in a prior 
suit brought by A against B.77 
Mendoza involved the Nationality Act of 1940, which had been amended 
in 194278 to make it easier for foreigners who had served honorably in the U.S. 
military during World War II to become American citizens by, for example, 
waiving any residency requirement and permitting qualified applicants to be 
naturalized overseas, rather than within the United States.79  That system did 
not work as planned in the Philippines, however, because because Japanese 
occupation made U.S. naturalizations impossible until 1945.80  Moreover, 
after gaining its independence from the United States in 1946,81 the 
Philippine government did not want to lose its citizens to this nation.82  As the 
result, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) did not send a 
representative to the Philippines until 1945 and, even then, temporarily 
halted all such naturalizations in the Philippines from October 1945 until 
August 1946.83  The eligibility window under the amended Nationality Act of 
1940, however, closed at the end of 1946.84  Sergio Mendoza sued, arguing 
that his inability to apply for citizenship deprived him of due process of law.85  
 
 74 See, e.g., Litchfield, 123 U.S. at 551–52. 
 75 See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard 
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 282 (1957); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 27 (AM. L. INST. 1982); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (3d ed. 2016). 
 76 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a defendant could plead res judicata against 
a plaintiff patentee whose patent had been declared invalid in a prior proceeding). 
 77 439 U.S. 322, 333 (1979) (barring a defendant from relitigating an issue it lost in 
earlier litigation). 
 78 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1005. 
 79 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 156 (1984). 
 80  Id.  
 81  Treaty of General Relations and Protocol, Phil.-U.S., July 4, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1568. 
 82  Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 156. 
 83 Id.  
 84  Id.  
 85 Id. at 156–57. 
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Pointing to the judgment entered against the government in an earlier lawsuit 
involving the same claim,86 the district court held that the government was 
precluded—viz., collaterally estopped—from relitigating that issue in 
Mendoza.87  The district court entered judgment in Mendoza’s favor on that 
ground.  The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed.88 
The Court recognized that the collateral estoppel effect of a federal 
court judgment was an issue of federal law, to be decided in the same way that 
the Court resolved the issues in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane: by using the old-
fashioned common law decision-making process of balancing the benefits and 
costs of a proposed rule.89  At the outset, the Court noted that the federal 
government occupied a unique position in federal court litigation, because it 
was involved in a far greater number of cases than any private party was and 
because many constitutional questions can only arise in the context of public 
litigation.90  Allowing a nonparty to bind the federal government whenever it 
lost a case, the Court reasoned, would have serious adverse consequences. 
Principal among them was the damage that such a rule would do to the 
Supreme Court’s own decision-making ability.  The Court generally prefers to 
wait until numerous lower courts, the legal profession, and the academy have 
fully thrashed out an issue before taking it up.  That approach—colloquially 
known as allowing an issue to “percolate” in the lower courts—gives the Court 
the opportunity to have the competing arguments fully debated so that the 
Court can learn the correct, or at least best, answer to a legal issue.91  Binding 
the government everywhere and forever once it lost an issue—particularly an 
important one, or one involving a matter of constitutional law—would 
jeopardize that valuable educational approach, pithily described by Professor 
Bray as, “[m]easure twice, cut once.”92  The federal government would be 
compelled to appeal every adverse ruling, even if prudential concerns 
militated against doing so in particular cases, to avoid having one district court 
judge decide an issue for the entire nation.93  The Court declined to leave the 
matter to a case-by-case balancing of the equities associated with each lower 
 
 86 See In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 
1975). 
 87 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 157. 
 88 Id. at 164. 
 89 Id. at 162–63. 
 90 Id. at 159 (quoting INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam)). 
 91 See id. at 160 (“A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the 
Government in such cases would substantially thwart the development of important 
questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.  
Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from 
permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants 
certiorari. . . .  Indeed, if nonmutual estoppel were routinely applied against the 
Government, this Court would have to revise its practice of waiting for a conflict to develop 
before granting the Government’s petitions for certiorari.”). 
 92 Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 422. 
 93 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161 (citing Brief for United States, at 30–31). 
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court decision because of the uncertainty it would generate.  That approach 
“leaves the Government at sea because it cannot possibly anticipate, in 
determining whether or not to appeal an adverse decision, whether a court 
will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case.”94  As the result, the Court 
unanimously held that a party cannot make offensive collateral estoppel use 
of an adverse final judgment against the federal government.95 
While Mendoza discusses the effect of a judgment at the back end of a 
case, Williams v. Zbaraz discusses the “Case” or “Controversy” requirement at 
the front end.96  The plaintiffs in Zbaraz challenged the constitutionality of an 
Illinois law that declined to fund elective abortions,97 on the ground that the 
statute denied an indigent woman the right to obtain an abortion under Roe 
v. Wade.98  Although the federal Hyde Amendment99 imposed a parallel limit 
on federal reimbursement for elective abortions, the plaintiffs did not claim 
that that statute infringed on their rights.100  Nonetheless, the district court, 
believing that the two statutes were closely interrelated, held both laws 
unconstitutional.101  The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the district 
court “lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde 
Amendment” for two reasons: none of the parties had challenged the 
constitutionality of that statute, and the district court could have awarded the 
plaintiffs complete relief based only and entirely on a judgment in their favor 
holding the Illinois law invalid.102  Under those circumstances, the Court held, 
the district court acted in “the absence of a case or controversy sufficient to 
permit an exercise” of the Article III judicial power.103  Zbaraz therefore stands 
for the proposition that a district court lacks jurisdiction to grant a prevailing 
party relief on an issue not in dispute in the case and unnecessary to fully 
remedy the plaintiff’s injury.  It logically follows that a district court lacks 
jurisdiction to award relief to a nonparty as to whom there is, by definition, 
no “Case” or “Controversy” with anyone before any litigation is brought. 
The rationales that the Court found compelling in Mendoza and Zbaraz 
apply perforce in any case involving a universal injunction.  Indeed, there is 
 
 94 Id. at 162. 
 95 Id. at 155, 162.  The literature on nationwide injunctions has only lightly touched 
on the Mendoza decision.  Most commentators either give the ruling short shrift or say that 
it was wrongly decided and should be overruled.  See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 10, at 22. 
 96 448 U.S. 358 (1980). 
 97 Id. at 361. 
 98 Brief of Appellees at 22, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (Nos. 79-4, 79-5, 
79-491). 
 99 Since 1976, Congress has included a rider, known as the Hyde Amendment, on 
Medicaid appropriations.  Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 362 n.4.  The Hyde Amendment prohibits the 
use of federal funds to perform elective abortions.  Id. 
 100 See id. at 361. 
 101 Id. at 365–66; see also Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 
(district court decision).  The district court felt compelled to do so given an earlier order 
by the Seventh Circuit.  Id. at 1216, 1221. 
 102 See Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 367. 
 103 Id. 
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little, if anything, that could be added to the Court’s discussions to 
demonstrate why universal injunctions are unsound as a matter of policy.  
Mendoza ensures that no one adverse judgment can foreclose the federal 
government from implementing a statute or operating a program in 
connection with persons not named in the judgment.  That choice is for 
Congress to undertake via the passage of a generally applicable “Law.”  
Mendoza also avoids the unseemly forum shopping, and asymmetric 
development of the law, that the contrary rule would encourage.  After all, 
there are hundreds of federal district court judges, and institutional litigants 
have every incentive to find one to rule in their favor.  Zbaraz complements 
Mendoza by making clear that a court may not enter judgment on an issue that 
is not in dispute between the parties.  That being so, it should be immaterial 
whether that judgment embraces issues or people outside of the original 
dispute.104  The Court made that point in Hansberry v. Lee,105 holding that it is 
a violation of due process when a judgment binds a person who is not 
designated a party to the lawsuit, outside the limited exception for class 
actions.106  When a court purports to do that, it is no longer deciding a case 
or controversy but exercising Congress’s power to make laws of general 
concern.  But unlike Congress, the courts are not accountable to the people 
when they exercise the legislative power.107 
To be sure, “freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular 
legal issue”108 could be said to be a more efficient way of developing 
contemporary legal doctrines, particularly in important cases of national 
application, because it would force the government to make its best case the 
first time an issue arises.  But that approach forces the government to win 
every lawsuit to avoid ever being bound by an adverse judgment.  It also puts 
tremendous pressure on the Supreme Court to loosen restraints imposed on 
judicial decisionmaking by the doctrine of stare decisis.  That doctrine 
represents a judgment that a rule of law adopted by the courts ought to stand 
unless there is a “special justification” for jettisoning it.109  Stare decisis seeks 
to generate certainty in the law and confidence in the courts by requiring 
rules of law to remain in place, except for extraordinary reasons, as individual 
judges come and go.  Put differently, the doctrine exists to prevent the law 
 
 104 See Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 4, at 471–72, 471 nn.311–12, 472 nn.313–
14. 
 105 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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from being batted back and forth like a tennis ball.  If the Court were denied 
the opportunity to wait until numerous lower courts had debated an issue, 
there is a considerable risk that the Court would later conclude that its initial 
answer was incorrect.  Remorse over giving the wrong answer to a hastily 
considered issue might increase the Court’s willingness to reconsider its initial 
decisions, thereby weakening the benefits that stare decisis provides for the 
legal system.  Eliminating the flexibility that the Court enjoys at the front end 
of the process—enjoys, that is, by allowing numerous lower courts to address 
an issue—would force the Court to increase the flexibility it has at the “back 
end”—by upping its willingness to overrule decisions that it now believes are 
mistaken.  That tradeoff does not improve the Court’s decision-making 
process, but it does increase the risk that the law will be seen as up for grabs 
and that the Justices will be seen as political actors, as members of Congress 
in black robes rather than suits.  That certainly would not be an improvement 
in the fact or appearance of impartiality and legitimacy in the legal process. 
Indeed, these considerations apply with even greater force to nationwide 
injunctions than to the offensive use against the government of a prior adverse 
judgment, as Parklane allows.  A nationwide injunction has a greater impact 
than the Parklane doctrine because it grants relief to third parties who never 
file their own lawsuit.  The possibility that the same judge who ruled against 
the government in the first case will reconsider his or her ruling is far less 
than the likelihood that a new judge might uncritically apply the first 
judgment.  People disagree over controversial issues, and judges are people, 
so one or more judges are likely to disagree with whoever first decides a case.  
That, in turn, increases the potential that additional judges will join them in 
the debate, raising the possibility of a consensus emerging as to the correct or 
best resolution that differs from the first decision. 
Here’s an example.  Witness what happened in the litigation over the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  Between the dates that the Act went into 
effect on November 1, 1987, and the Supreme Court upheld its 
constitutionality on January 18, 1989, over various separation-of-powers 
challenges, one circuit court and at least 145 district courts had ruled that the 
Act was unconstitutional.110  Throughout that entire period, no one argued 
that the federal government was everywhere and forever bound by the first 
adverse district court ruling.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the 
rulings of all those courts in Mistretta v. United States and upheld the 
Sentencing Reform Act over the same separation-of-powers challenges that 
numerous lower courts had found persuasive.111  The Supreme Court might 
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not have been able to do so if the first district court ruling was dispositive.  
The result is that the slow-but-steady system works. 
Moreover, in cases where, before Mendoza, collateral estoppel might have 
been asserted against the government, percolation serves only one purpose: 
it allows multiple judges, parties, amici, and scholars to consider the issue and 
prove the old adage that two (or more) heads are better than one.  The issue 
itself, however, is defined before collateral estoppel may be invoked.112  In the 
case of nationwide injunctions, though, percolation serves an additional 
purpose: it narrows the issues of law and fact implicated by the challenged 
law, rule, or policy.  Whereas collateral estoppel may be invoked only after the 
issue has been defined, a nationwide injunction may grant relief to third 
parties even if their hypothetical cases raise quite different issues of law or fact 
than the plaintiff’s.  Because the Court’s rationale in Mendoza for rejecting the 
Parklane doctrine applies with even greater force to nationwide injunctions 
than it did to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, the Court’s rationale 
in Mendoza forbids the use of nationwide injunctions.113 
CONCLUSION 
Both the Constitution and the Judicial Code, as informed by the lessons 
of history, are relevant to the legality of nationwide injunctions in two ways.  
They authorize federal courts to award relief to the parties in a particular 
“Case” or “Controversy,” and they prohibit the courts from entering a 
judgment that is tantamount to the type of “Law” that only Congress can pass.  
Nationwide injunctions cross the line separating the former from the latter 
because they are unnecessary to provide complete relief to the prevailing 
party, and they prevent the federal government from enforcing an act of 
Congress against nonparties.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Mendoza and 
Zbaraz reinforce the evident meaning of the Constitution and Judicial Code 
by prohibiting federal courts from granting relief beyond the specific parties 
and claims at issue in a particular case.  To uphold nationwide injunctions, 
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the Court would need to overrule Mendoza and Zbaraz because nationwide 
injunctions effectively nullify those decisions.  Unless and until Congress 
endorses that practice, the federal courts should limit relief to the parties to 
a lawsuit. 
